

CHAPTER III

Operations

(U) This chapter surveys four major operations undertaken by the Air National Guard between 1986 and 1991 and the National Guard Bureau's (NGB) role in them: the U.S. invasion of Panama, Operation Just Cause, Operations Desert Shield and Storm, and Counterdrug Operations. Although these were not the sole operations of the Air Guard during that period, they were the most significant in regard to the Air Guard primary mission, as a reserve component of the Air Force, and secondary mission, other support to states and territories, such as emergency and relief missions, and counterdrug operations.

Operation Just Cause.

(U) The United States has had an interest in the political stability of the Central American republics since the completion of the Panama Canal in 1914. U.S. military intervention in Central America was common prior to President Roosevelt's administration. Operation Just Cause was seen by some as a return to that policy. Although the Panama Canal was no longer critical to the U.S. hemispheric defense, it will probably remain under the defensive umbrella of the United States for many years to come. Since local political stability and the lives and well-being of U.S. citizens were threatened by Manuel Noriega, "strongman" and dictator of Panama, the U.S. considered military intervention was necessary to unseat him from power and bring him to justice.¹

(See Illustration III-1, map of Panama.)

Illustration III-1 (U)

Map of Panama^{*}

^{*} SOURCE: PAM (U), Dept. of the Army, Office of Public Affairs, "Soldiers in Panama, Stories of Operation Just Cause," p 5.

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(U) The Air National Guard (ANG) played a limited but significant role in Just Cause. ANG resources were used by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) during the operation in the airlift and air interdiction missions. Perhaps even more interesting was the precedent for the use of ANG "volunteers" in the operation which was a major issue in the restructuring and use of air reserve components (ARC) in U.S. Air Force war and contingency planning.

Political Background

(U) Political difficulties between Panama and the United States had been brewing since August 1983 when Colonel Manuel Noriega took over as Chief of the Panamanian Defense Forces and installed a puppet president. Noriega's seizure of power strained relations between the U.S. and Panama. Diplomatic relations had not been greatly improved by Noriega's obstreperous predecessor General Omar Torrijos, under whose administration the Panama Canal was by agreement to be turned over to Panama in the year 2000. Diplomatic relations continued to deteriorate culminating in the Miami and Tampa, Florida, federal grand juries issuing indictments of Manuel Noriega on drug trafficking charges on 4 February 1988. Evidence of drug dealing accumulated against Noriega and incidences of intimidation against U.S. military and civilian personnel increased. The U.S. passed economic sanctions against Panama on 9 April 1988 in reaction to harassment of U.S. military personnel by Noriega's government.

(U) As Noriega's legal term neared an end, new presidential elections were held in Panama from 7-9 May 1989.

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Noriega suspended the results of the election which was legally won by his opponent Guillermo Endara. Noriega also harrassed and physically abused Endara and members of his entourage following the coup. On 3 October 1989 an attempted U.S.-backed coup against Noriega failed, and on 15 December Noriega declared war on the United States. The final low point of U.S.-Panamanian relations occurred on 16 December 1989 when U.S. Marine First Lieutenant Robert Paz was shot and killed by Panamanian soldiers while off duty and in civilian clothes. That same day Navy Lieutenant Adam J. Curtis and his wife Bonnie were abused by Panamanian troops. On 20 December, President George Bush ordered a military operation to proceed against Panama with four major objectives: to protect the lives of American citizens, to secure the Panama Canal, to support democracy for the Panamanian people, and to apprehend Manuel Noriega and bring him to trial for international drug trafficking.²

(U) Guillermo Endara was sworn in as president of Panama with Guillermo Ford and Ricardo Arias Calderon as vice-presidents at 0015 hours on 20 December 1989, only forty-five minutes before the invasion began. President Endara gave permission for U.S. forces to enter the country to apprehend and unseat Noriega from power.

Air National Guard Involvement

(U) Air National Guard units participated in Operation Just Cause because of their scheduled presence in Panama. Only the 193d Special Operations Group (SOG), Pennsylvania ANG, was part of the integral planning process by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Air Staff for the invasion of

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Panama.

(U) ANG personnel from the 146th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW), 136th TAW, 139th Tactical Airlift Group (TAG), and 166th TAG participated as forces in the Volant Oak exercise in Panama. Volant Oak was a C-130 Hercules exercise which was supported by the ANG and the Air Force Reserve (AFRES) and had provided theater airlift support to SOUTHCOM since October 1977. This exercise involved 110 people, of which 55 rotated each Saturday. Volant Oak flew regularly scheduled missions throughout Latin America, and these were called "channel flights" and comprised most of the flying requirements. The units were also available to fly "special assignment airlift missions" (SAAM) which were specifically requested and paid for by the user. In the case of Operation Just Cause, the ANG's eight C-141s and 15 C-130s were tasked to be part of the operation by SOUTHCOM early on 20 December 1989.³

(U) Other ANG forces deployed to the theater in support of the Coronet Cove mission were the 114th Tactical Fighter Group (TFG) and the 180th TFG. Both of these units flew missions in support of the operation. Coronet Cove was an ANG A-7D Corsair II mission that provided aircraft and personnel for the defense of the Panama Canal since 1978. The last ANG Coronet Cove rotation took place at Howard AFB, Panama, from 20 January through 17 February 1990. Each deployed ANG unit provided four or five aircraft for a month at a time and rotated crews every two weeks.⁴

(U) The Operation was classified Top Secret prior to

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implementation which contributed to its successful outcome. But it complicated communications problems for the Air Directorate when they were tasked to provide support for the operation. It was difficult to task units when there was no clear understanding as to what was actually occurring.

(U) Prior to H-hour the 145th TAG was tasked by ANG Operations to deliver anti-icing fluid by truck and the 118th TAW and 105th Military Airlift Group (MAG) were tasked to fly anti-icing fluid and equipment to Pope AFB, North Carolina, for use on the troop transports cueing up for the invasion. Initially Pope AFB Operations was not told why deicing fluid was required and refused delivery. Later this decision was reversed. Medical units from the 109th TAG and the 172d MAG were tasked prior to the operation and responded at 100 percent strength with volunteer personnel.

(U) The contingency plan for military intervention in Panama had been named "Blue Spoon", then it was renamed "Just Cause" by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney shortly before the operation as being a more fitting name for the invasion.⁵

H-hour for the operation began at 0045 hours on 20 December 1989 with Army ground, airborne and Marine forces rapidly seizing key facilities throughout Panama in accordance with the operations plan which stressed speed and overwhelming force to overcome objectives. Fighting caused the Panama Canal to close for most of the day. Airlift of troops and cargo into Panama was constant with SOUTHCOM tasked ANG units doing many of the missions.

(U) The majority of fighting took place on 20 December

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with U.S. troops controlling most Panamanian bases and the government television station by day's end. One of the first targets to be hit was the radio tower which silenced the National Radio network. The radio network continued to broadcast fighting appeals to the PDF until its capture in late afternoon. By midnight on 20 December Americans and other foreigners trapped inside the Marriott Hotel in Panama City were freed by airborne troops of the 82d Airborne Division.

(U) Resistance continued because of Panamanian "dignity" battalions which Noriega had formed around the countryside. These dignity battalions were no more than groups of untrained rabble organized into groups from a dozen to 150 people. In Panama City dignity battalion personnel were concentrated in the poorer sections and when the operation was fully underway proceeded to pillage local stores and businesses. The operation was complicated by the chaos created by the dignity battalions. An example of this was a group of Smithsonian Institute scientists who were found in the village of Carti on 21 December after having been taken hostage the previous day by dignity battalion personnel.

(U) The Panama Canal opened on 21 December and most of the fighting was reduced to the Rio Hato area southwest of the Canal Zone. Fighting steadily diminished between 22 December 1989 and 3 January 1990. Manuel Noriega asked for asylum at the residence of the Vatican representative in Panama City at 1530 EST on Christmas Eve and was granted asylum. American soldiers and tanks quickly surrounded the residence of the Papal Nuncio, Monsignor Juan Laboa, and blocked all approaches to the area. Noriega finally

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surrendered to U.S. officials on 3 January 1990 and with his surrender the major combat portion of Operation Just Cause ended.⁶

(U) Air National Guard participation in Operation Just Cause included both airlift, fighter, and special operations units throughout the operation. At 0545 hours on 20 December 1989 the security classification for the operation was lifted, and the Air Guard Crisis Action Team (CAT) at NGB Support Center, Andrews AFB, Maryland, became officially operational. The CAT team at NGB Andrews had anticipated the operation, not because of inclusion into the invasion planning process, but because personnel at the NGB noticed an increase of activity around locations such as Pope AFB, North Carolina, through the ANG node of the MAC Global Decision Support System (locator board). This and other secretive taskings by MAC prewarned the NGB staff that something of significance was ready to occur.⁷

(U) At 0700Z hours the ANGSC alerted the Airlift Control Element (ALCE) teams at the 118th TAW, 146th TAW, 137th TAW, 123d TAW, 133d TAW, and the 136th TAW. These teams loaded supply and troop aircraft enroute to Operation Just Cause. Aerial Port personnel of the 164th TAG and 165th TAG loaded equipment on C-5A aircraft. The 105th MAG and 172d MAG participated in providing airlift support to SOUTHCOM after the initial airdrop and flew 35 missions, completed 138 sorties moved 1911 passengers and 1404.7 tons of cargo and expended 434.6 flying hours.

(U) The ANG Volant Oak C-130 aircrews flew 22 missions,

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completed 181 sorties, moved 3107 passengers and 551.3 tons of cargo, and expended 140.1 flying hours. Of the 775 airlift missions performed by MAC units from 17 December 1989 through 14 February 1990, transport aircraft of the AFRES and ANG flew, respectively, 18.8 percent and 7.35 percent of all airlift missions for the operation.

(U) What began as an ordinary deployment by 16 unit members of the 166th TAG, Delaware ANG, originally involved in exercise Volant Oak, evolved into an interesting venture.

Unit members witnessed the buildup of Army forces at Howard AFB, Panama, where trees had been cut around the periphery of the field to make room for Chinook C-47 helicopters. Also an unusually large number of aircraft were flying into the air base at all hours of the day. At 0045 hours on 20 December, Major Scott G. Allen, aircraft commander, was awakened by the sound like thunder which was actually the C-130 gunships and Army attack helicopters devastating the PDF headquarters in Panama City. During the day Major Allen performed as Supervisor of Flying duties (SOF) and provided transportation for other aircrews. All of the other ANG C-130 aircraft were assigned missions and were launched. On 22 December Major Allen and his crew flew missions hauling Special Forces and their equipment from General Omar Torrijos Herrera International Airport, Panama City, and Howard AFB to Rio Hato Airfield. Fighting was still going on adjacent to the airstrip which had sustained much damage. During the course of the day, Major Allen's crew flew 13 sorties and transported 84 troopers and 64,500 pounds of equipment into Rio Hato and returned with one soldier killed in action. Blackout conditions added to stress which required landing lights to be turned on just prior to landing to avoid

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obstructions and immediately turned off again after land was completed. The flying day ended at 2145 hours EST. The following day, 23 December, Major Allen's crew flew Special Forces assault troops out of Rio Hato and into Howard AFB for redeployment to Panama City. That day the aircraft hauled 218 troopers and 118,000 pounds of cargo. The 61st MAG (USAF) requested that the scheduled rotation of ANG aircraft be extended one day to 24 December to complete the rotation of the 403d TAW (AFRES) which was complete, with the ANG unit rotating out of Panama on 24 December 1989.⁸

(U) The Coronet Cove units, 114 TFG and the 180 TFG flew 34 missions, completed 34 sorties, expended 71.7 flying hours and expended 2715 rounds of 20mm ammunition. These units flew close air support missions, armed reconnaissance and convoy escort missions, as well as aircraft intercept and identification missions. The 180th TFG provided six pilots who flew daily missions against pockets of resistance of Panamanian troops loyal to General Noriega. Their A-7D Corsair attack fighters were equipped with bombs and 20mm ammunition and were on call 24 hours a day on fifteen minute alert to respond to SOUTHCOM close air support requests. The 114th TFG rotated into theater to take the place of the 180th TFG. During 23 to 28 December, the 114th TFG flew air cover for troop convoys and provided aerial surveillance over combat areas and the borders of Columbia and Costa Rica. The 114th TFG completed all missions and returned to South Dakota on 6 January 1990.

(U) The 193d SOG flew 18 missions, completed 18 sorties, and expended 140.1 flying hours in accordance with the Operations Plan for Just Cause.⁹

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(U) Other units such as the 172d MAG, Jackson, Mississippi, flew 21 sorties in support of the operation from 20 December 1989 through 12 January 1990. The first of the C-141B Starlifters delivered 24 combat troops and 31,288 pounds of cargo to Howard AFB, Panama. Over the duration of the operation the 172d MAG hauled 1,274 personnel and 403.6 tons of cargo in 89 sorties. On Christmas Eve the 164 Mobile Aerial Port Squadron, Memphis, Tennessee was called in to build pallets of meals ready to eat (MREs) for the operation's forces. The 172d MAG and 105th MAG continued to fly missions over the holidays. The 105 MAG commander called all 1500 unit members to duty over Christmas to keep the C-5As flying. Operation Just Cause was the first major example of ANG units being asked to "volunteer" for federally mandated missions rather than being "mobilized" first. This aspect of "volunteerism" affected ANG participation in other future operations such as Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm.¹⁰

(U) Air National Guard participation in Operation Just Cause was summed up by Major General Philip Killey, Air Guard Director, in a message on 24 December 1989 to Volant Oak and Coronet Cove personnel. On 2 February the message was extended to all participating ANG units. He stated that ANG actions in the Operation, while in a nonmobilized status, clearly demonstrated the patriotism, willingness, and sense of duty which these citizen soldiers contributed to the defense of democracy and freedom in a world scenario in spite of dangerous and adverse conditions. This illustrated the ANG capability and willingness to be an integrated part of the Total Force policy of the Department of Defense.¹¹

Operation Desert Shield.

(U) On 17 July 1990, the dictator of Iraq Saddam Hussein accused the United States of manipulating the oil market and made verbal attacks on Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Shortly thereafter Iraq began moving 30,000 troops toward the southern part of the country, close to Kuwait and Saudi Arabian borders. This military positioning continued throughout the month of July 1990. Despite this sword rattling by Saddam Hussein, no one seemed to have expected Iraq to attack Kuwait. On 25 July Saddam Hussein promised not to attack Kuwait as long as conciliation talks continued with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and with OPEC about oil overproduction by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Hussein had demanded in May that Kuwait pay Iraq \$27 billion to make up for oil overproduction past the OPEC quotas.

(U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Robert M. Gates assured President Bush in the fall of 1989 that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would not attack any of his neighbors for the next two to three years. The ten year war between Iran and Iraq was recently concluded and it was the CIA's belief that Hussein would focus on rebuilding his country internally and economically.¹²

(U) Just after 0200 hours (Local Time) (1900 hours EST) on 2 August 1990, 120,000 Iraqi combat troops rolled across the border of Kuwait in T-72 tanks and armored personnel carriers. The attack was well timed because it came when the Kuwaiti government was least alert and when many of its senior officials were on vacation abroad. Also it occurred

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during the hottest time of the year making a military counterattack difficult. Kuwaiti officials outside of the country formed an effective government in exile.¹³

(U) Iraq's continued presence in Kuwait could not be tolerated. As Allied Coalition forces continued to build in Saudi Arabia, Hussein's forces continued to build in southern Iraq and in Kuwait. Iraqi forces threatened the rich oil fields of Saudi Arabia which, if seized, could cripple the economies of many nations. Iraq's oil reserves when combined with Kuwait's totaled 195 billion barrels, 20 percent of the world supply, making the reserves of oil controlled by Iraq second only to those of Saudi Arabia's 255 billion barrels. If Iraq's oil reserves were added to those of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia they would equal 40 percent of the world's oil supply.

(U) President Bush and other world leaders were quick to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. On 6 August 1990, the United Nations Security Council voted mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq and occupied Kuwait in Resolution 661. The resolution obliged the United Nation's 159 member states to "prevent the import into their territories of all commodities and exports from Iraq and Kuwait after 6 August 1990, and to keep their nationals and others from operating in their territories from selling or supplying to Iraq and Kuwait any commodities or products,.... except for food and medicine."

(U) Meanwhile U.S. and UN coalition troops deployed to the Persian Gulf area after King Fahd of Saudi Arabia lifted the restrictions on the number of foreign troops on Saudi

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soil. It was unlikely that any state in the region would accept a large number of non Muslim troops on their soil without an imminent crisis. Once the crisis was past the U.S. had to assure local governments that it would withdraw its troops in favor of naval forces. There was the Saudi fear that the presence of "infidel" (non Muslim) troops so close to the holiest sites in Islam would provoke an internal revolt or an attack from Hussein. Saudi Arabia's 66,000 National Guard were not enough to stem an invasion by Iraq's massive forces. Economic sanctions and the buildup of coalition forces on the Arabian peninsula did not persuade Hussein to leave Kuwait. Instead, Hussein heightened international opposition by encouraging his troops to launch an unrestrained reign of terror upon helpless Kuwaiti citizens. Hussein prohibited westerners from leaving Iraq and Kuwait and further restrained American and British nationals by holding them hostage. In October, November and early December he slowly released the hostages but his troops surrounded the embassies of allied nations in Kuwait City.¹⁴

(U) Within sixty days of the request on 6 August 1990 from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia for U.S. military assistance, the number of U.S. military personnel in the region jumped from 10,000 to 200,000. The forward presence of U.S. naval forces, rapid deployment of Air Force fighter squadrons, B-52 bombers to Diego Garcia, and prepositioned equipment in the region were essential to demonstrate U.S. resolve to deal with Saddam Hussein's aggression.

(U) The U.S. military response to the crisis in the Persian Gulf began on 7 August 1990 with ANG units being among the first to deploy. President George Bush waited

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until 22 August 1990 to issue his 200 thousand Reserve call-up authority. This was the first time the 200K authority was used since it became law in 1976.

(U) On 22 August 1990, President Bush invoked Title 10 U.S. Code, section 673b, which authorized the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation, with respect to the Coast Guard, to order to active duty organized units and individual members of the Selected Reserve. The initial call-up authorized a maximum of 50,000 personnel to be called to active duty. On 14 November 1990 the number was increased to 122,000 and on 6 December 1990 a further increase of 188,000 was ordered.¹⁵

(U) On 24 August 1990 the UN Security Council authorized member states to use military force to stop shipping bound for Kuwait to determine the type of cargo allowed by the embargo. Even Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev joined the chorus of world leaders by condemning Iraq's illegal act and declared the Soviet Union was united with the coalition against Iraq's aggression.

(U) On 29 November 1990 the UN Security Council authorized the use "all means necessary", including military force, to remove Hussein from Kuwait if his forces were not withdrawn by 15 January 1991. This UN Resolution 678 gave Hussein 48 days to leave Kuwait or face a coalition war. Resolution 678 was a landmark decision which was only the second time in the UN's 45 year history that individual member nations had been given the right to wage war unilaterally against another state.¹⁶

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(U) Coalition forces included NATO members who participated in the action against Iraq by sending more than a token national air, land, or naval force. New Zealand provided two C-130s, Niger sent 480 troops to guard Muslim shrines in Mecca and Medina, and 300 Mujaheddin from Afganistan were in the area of operation (AO). A list of Coalition members is at Illustration III-2.

(U) U.S. forces in the area of operations (AO) as of January 1991 were a total of 383,802 military personnel of which 23,522 were women. The total personnel in the U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT), 9th Air Force, was 43,723 personnel including 2,695 women. There were 1,079 USAF aircraft deployed for the operation which flew 555 total sorties in the areas of tactical support, tanker refueling, and intratheater airlift.

(U) The buildup of troops and supplies was enormous with the USAF strategic airlift by early November 1990 totaling 5,226 missions in the AO, which moved 178,358 tons of cargo, and 185,891 passengers. Logistical priorities were engine parts, resupply and war readiness spares kits, and other war materials.

(U) The Iraqis seemed formidable in numbers with their modern equipment which had been mostly obtained from the Eastern Block. In November 1990 total Iraqi aircraft inventory included 445 fighters, 332 of these being all-weather capable, 401 fighter-bombers, 73 transports, and 583 attack helicopters. Iraqi ground forces on 15 January 1991 had elements of 35 divisions in Kuwait theater of operations (KTO) totaling 546,700 troops. These forces possessed 4,280

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tanks, 2,880 armored personnel carriers, and 3,100 artillery pieces. KTO forces had elements of 125 brigades: 42 heavy and 83 light. Even with these numbers and modern equipment the Iraqis lacked sufficient training and leadership which caused them to falter and crumble under the military coalition force arrayed against them.¹⁷

Air National Guard Volunteers

(U) Immediately after the Iraqi invasion the Chief, NGB, Lt Gen John B. Conaway and Director, Air National Guard (ANG) Maj Gen Philip G. Killey, began to survey their resources in view of the requirements of U.S. forces to begin movement of troops and equipment to Saudi Arabia. One of the first ANG units contacted to volunteer by the Air Staff through the National Guard Bureau was the 172d Military Airlift Group (MAG), Jackson, Mississippi. The 172d reported one C-141 immediately available and four other C-141 Starlifters were ready within sixteen hours with two more C-141s available with crews the following day. Also Persian/Arabic linguists were requested to volunteer by the Air Staff and the 169 Electronic Security Squadron (ESS), Utah ANG responded with six linguists. These linguists facilitated the buildup of logistical bases and U.S. troop concentrations on Saudi soil.

(U) The 105th MAG, Newburgh, New York, received a call from Headquarters Military Airlift Command (MAC) on airlift capabilities on 3 August 1990. They reported that two aircraft were available with another on five hour recall. HQ

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Air Force notified the NGB Contingency Support Staff (CSS) to be on 24 hour alert for tasking missions. ANG combat communications squadrons (CCS) were alerted by Headquarters USAF; the 290th CCS, Florida; the 224th CCS, Georgia; and the 281st CCS, Rhode Island.¹⁸

(U) Headquarters USAF issued the first deployment warning order on 6 August 1990 which tasked the ANG to provide C-5 and C-141 airlift support, KC-135 refuelers, and airlift Control Element augmentation. NGB/CSS provided 47 KC-135Es and crews of 30 day volunteers. A C-141 Starlifter of the 172d MAG flew the first sortie in support of Operation Desert Shield on 7 August, carrying five 172d MAG and eight Air Force crews to Torrejon AFB, Spain. One C-5A Galaxy was also sent to Moron, Spain and carried four stage crews and 38 passengers.¹⁹

(U) In the meantime, Air Force planners had identified the need for ANG assets and had coordinated their requests through the NGB/CSS. By 10 September 1990 the total number of ANG volunteers that supported Operation Desert Shield had grown to 3,035. On that same date, nearly one month after the President had authorized call-up authority, only 370 ANG personnel, represented by two strategic airlift squadrons and one mobile aerial port squadron (MAPS), the 136 MAPS, Dallas, Texas, had been mobilized for duty by the Air Force. With the available call-up authority, the number of Air Guardsmen involuntarily called to active duty continued to increase while the number of volunteers remained constant. In some cases personnel who had volunteered were converted to mobilized status. On 5 December 1990 2,850 ANG volunteers continued to serve on active duty to support Desert Shield,

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while the number involuntarily called had increased to 1,204.²⁰

(U) Air Force requests for ANG unit volunteers for Desert Shield passed through the NGB to the units concerned.

These requests were preceded by a series of "possibility questions" which left open to the unit commander what resources and services would be reasonable to supply. Recent installation of secure voice telephones facilitated voice communications but lack of classified FAX machines hampered transfer of information.

(U) ANG liaison officers at the various MAJCOM headquarters played critical roles in assessing individual unit capabilities and communicated that information to MAJCOM planners. Air Force requests for ANG unit support were usually preceded by a call from a senior NGB officer to the adjutants general at the state NG headquarters which facilitated approval of volunteer requests. Difficulty did arise in the effective use of volunteers due to coordination problems between the requesting MAJCOMs, NGB, and the supporting units. These problems resulted in some mismatches between required AFSCs and volunteer accessions. AFR 28-5 did not anticipate only Air Defense volunteers. It was written to provide procedures for accessing volunteers for any purpose and used Air Defense volunteers only as an example.

(U) With the rapid onset of the Desert Shield contingency, the Air Force called on the Air National Guard to respond quickly to the need for strategic airlift and aerial tanker support to rapidly project U.S. forces into the

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theater of operations. The Air National Guard responded in an overwhelmingly positive manner. As events continued to unfold and as the need for a large-scale buildup became apparent, the Air Guard was called upon to provide voluntary force enhancement across a whole spectrum of functional areas in both the theater of operations and as backfills, replacements, for active duty forces in the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas from the continental United States (OCONUS).²¹

(U) The authority under which ANG volunteers are placed on active duty was Title 10 U.S. Code, section 672(d). It required the consent of the state governor as well as the individual Guardsmen. There were no instances where the governor declined. Governors had in several instances sent personal letters of appreciation to volunteers and their families and issued press statements that supported the volunteer effort.²²

Air Guard Unit Response

(U) Operation Desert Shield taxed U.S. strategic airlift and sealift close to the maximum resources. Nearly 90 percent of MAC's active duty Air Force airlift fleet was committed to the effort. Headquarters MAC could not have fulfilled mission requirements without calling on ANG and AFRES units for either direct or backfill support. Military Traffic Management Command, a jointly staffed major Army command, had to charter more than 120 additional ships to provide sealift for the operation. ANG and AFRES activities performed ranged from augmenting deployed active duty units to filling the routine military support requirements both in

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the U.S. and abroad.

(U) On 19 August the 193d Special Operations Group, Pennsylvania ANG provided two EC-130s and two C-130s with 150 personnel activated through the volunteer program. Further mobilizations and prioritizations of various types of support units and flying units continued to build throughout the summer and into fall and winter.²³

(U) By late August 1990, the 172d MAG, Jackson, Mississippi had six of its eight C-141s and 14 strategic aircrews flying Desert Shield missions. Both ANG and AFRES units, having 60 percent of Air Force strategic airlift sources, supported Desert Shield. The ANG had 11 C-5A Galaxys, 105th MAG, New York ANG, and 8 C-141 Starlifters. Also 90 percent of MAC's aeromedical evacuation specialists were assigned to the ANG and AFRES with the ANG supporting the operation with 56 medical units.²⁴

(U) Due to a unique camera capability the 117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW), Alabama ANG, was specifically asked by Headquarters Air Force to organize and deploy a volunteer unit to support Desert Shield. At the time of this request the only way Headquarters Air Force could ask for this support was by asking for volunteers through NGB/CSS. The unit sent the six requested aircraft RF4-Cs and 115 personnel. They were replaced later in the operation by the 152nd Tactical Reconnaissance Group (TRG), of the Nevada ANG. Since call-up authority was in effect, the NGB decided to involuntarily call members of the 152d TRG to active duty for rotation on 10 November 1990. The request was for six aircraft and 150 personnel. All 150 members of

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the unit who had previously volunteered for 90 days volunteered for an additional 180 days to support the contingency.²⁵

(U) On 21 December 1990, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command (TAC), through coordination with NGB/CSS, called 30 Air Guardsmen, mostly pilots, from 12 different tactical fighter units to active duty for a period not to exceed 180 days. In theory after ANG units were called up under Presidential authority, the Air Force was able deal with ANG units directly. This did not work well in practice. Consequently, the Air Force coordinated actions through the NGB/CSS established to deal with the Persian Gulf crisis.²⁶

Illustration III-2 (U)
Coalition Members as of November 1990

Argentina	Greece	Qatar
Australia	Honduras	Saudi Arabia
Bahrain	Hungary	Senegal
Bangladesh	Italy	Spain
Belgium	Kuwait	Syria
Canada	Morocco	The Netherlands
Czechoslovakia	Norway	Turkey
Denmark	Oman	United Arab Emirates
Egypt	Pakistan	United Kingdom
France	Poland	
Germany	Portugal	

Operation Desert Storm.

(U) U.S. and allied air forces attacked Iraqi forces in Iraq and Kuwait 19 hours after the expiration of the UN deadline at 0230 hours local time, 16 January 1991. U.S. forces concentrated on destroying command and control headquarters, chemical and nuclear weapons targets, and SCUD missile launchers. See illustration III-2 for a list of ANG units or major portions of units that volunteered or were mobilized for Operation Desert Shield/Storm.²⁷

(U) Total ANG personnel who supported Operation Desert Storm were 1,145 volunteers including 5,118 mobilized in the theater of operations. There were 5,315 Air Guardsmen mobilized in CONUS and 692 mobilized in other theaters or overseas. There was a total of 12,270 Air Guard personnel in direct support of Operation Desert Storm.²⁸ (See Illustration 3, ANG AOR Beddown Locations, and Illustration 4, ANG European Beddown Locations.)

(U) On 20 January 1991 Headquarters MAC requested the call-up of 535 aeromedical evacuation personnel to Ramstein AFB, Germany and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. An additional 707 medical personnel went to support U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) locations, 522 personnel for aeromedical staging facilities , and 424 personnel to the David Grant USAF Medical Center, Travis AFB, CA, and backfills for Malcolm Grow and 12th Contingency Hospitals.²⁹

Illustration III-3 (U)
Air National Guard AOR Beddown Locations*

* SOURCE: Brfg (U), NGB/CSS, "MAP of AOR," 20 May 91, p 4.

Illustration III-4 (U)
Air National Guard European Beddown Locations^{*}

^{*} SOURCE: Brfg (U), NGB/CSS, "MAP of AOR," 20 May 91, p 5.

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(U) U.S. forces dropped 2500 tons of ordnance during the first 24 hours of the war which destroyed or neutralized Iraqi targets. On 18 January 1991 Iraq fired SCUD missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia and a Raytheon Patriot missile destroyed one near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Because of political considerations the U.S. and coalition air forces attacked and destroyed Iraqi SCUD missiles and launchers aimed at allied and Israeli population centers. Coalition forces committed many air interdiction missions against Iraqi SCUDs and launchers so that Israel would remain out of the war and keep the Arab countries satisfied that the military action was basically one of "Arab against Arab".

(U) On 22 January 1991 Iraqi SCUDs were fired at Tel Aviv, Israel, Riyadh and Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Patriot missiles missed a SCUD which hit Tel Aviv and caused 70 casualties. The political exigency of shooting down SCUDs caused the U.S. to claim a much higher effectiveness ratio for the Patriot Missile than was really the case. Iraq claimed 41 citizens killed and 191 wounded in allied air attacks which given the amount of ordnance dropped on Iraq proved that allied "selective bombing" was effective. At the same time Iraq began to blow up oil wells in Kuwait. Iraqi troops began to feel the sting of the allied air war and began to desert their positions. Approximately 1000 Iraqi wounded filled two Kuwaiti hospitals.

(U) By 24 January 1991 the coalition air forces had flown 2000 air sorties with the loss of one U.S. F-16 fighter. Its bombers flew more than 17,500 sorties with intensified attacks on supply depots, bridges, and critical roads, as well as artillery. The Soviet news agency TASS

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(Telegrafnoye Agenftvo Sovyetskovo Soyuz/ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) reported that Hussein executed air force and air defense commanders. Iraq had lost 300 aircraft by late January 1991. On 27 January 1991, 23 Iraqi aircraft flew to neutral territory in Iran after losing four MIG-23s in aerial combat. The coalition air war, which began on 17 January 1991, continued with a ferocity unprecedented in air war history.

(U) On 31 January 1991, allied bombers struck thousands of Iraqi troops and vehicles moving in Kuwait along a 15-mile stretch of road named thereafter as the "highway of death". A total of 41 Iraqi tanks were destroyed and 500 prisoners were taken by Saudi forces in the two days of ground action at Khafji, a Kuwaiti border town on the Persian Gulf. Allied forces continued to bomb and strafe Iraqi convoys and targets, killing and wounding hundreds of Iraqi troops. Allied air forces conducted a heavy bombardment of Baghdad, Iraq, on 12 February 1991. Iraqi defectors put their military death toll at 20,000 troops.³⁰

(U) Between 17 January and 2 March 1991 coalition air forces flew over 112,000 sorties and dropped over 88,000 tons of bombs. Air attacks destroyed several thousand Iraqi armored vehicles and even large quantities of trucks. Air power destroyed most of the occupying Iraqi forces' supplies and cut their lines of communications. Allied air superiority denied Iraqi commanders the ability to "see" the battle situation from the air. Coalition air forces isolated the Iraqi Army and nearly destroyed it before the allied ground attack began on 24 February 1991.

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(U) Based on early estimates, air strikes alone killed or injured 150,000 Iraqi ground troops. Air power was also used as the key component in the allied psychological warfare campaign to demoralize the Iraqi Army by constant bombing and harassment strikes against it. When given the opportunity the Iraqi infantry surrendered by the thousands. Some Iraqi armored units put up a fight because allied armored units were blocking their routes of retreat.

(U) Casualty estimates for the entire war originally claimed that allied killed were between 4,000 and 7,000 with figures for wounded in action at 15,000 to 20,000. Many of the killed and wounded occurred in battles on the northern front. Estimates for Iraqi dead and wounded vary but American Broadcasting Company (ABC) used 60,000 as an approximate figure.³¹

(U) By 26 February 1991 Iraqi forces were in massive, disorganized retreat as allied forces continued to destroy all who did not surrender. There were 21 Iraqi divisions rendered combat ineffective with 2,085 tanks and 1,005 artillery pieces destroyed. At 1030 hours EST, Iraq agreed to accept UN Resolutions 662 and 674 which recognized the sovereignty of Kuwait and agreed to pay reparations after allies ceased fire and ended economic sanctions. At 2400 hours EST, 0800 hours Gulf time, coalition forces suspended combat operations against Iraq. As of 2 March 1991 U.S. Killed in Action (KIA) were 91, 213 Wounded in Action (WIA), and 44 Missing in Action (MIA). Some 80,000 Iraqis were EPWs, and Saudi Ambassador stated the number of Iraqi KIA were 100,000. Over 4000 Iraqi tanks were destroyed, 42 divisions captured, destroyed, or rendered combat

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ineffective; about 15-20,000 Iraqis remained in fighting formations at the end of the war.³²

(U) The House Armed Services Committee, Chaired by Les Aspin (D. WI), asserted in their report on lessons learned in the Gulf War that allied troop strength was near 700,000. Furthermore, many of the Iraqi units were understrength at the beginning of the air war. There were an estimated 153,000 Iraqi troops which deserted and another 26,000 who were killed or wounded during the air war. The estimated Iraqi troops present at the beginning of the ground war were 183,000. There were about 63,000 enemy prisoners of war and 120,000 were killed, wounded, or deserted during hostilities.³³

Air Guard Contributions to the War

(U) The Air National Guard provided strategic airlift to the operation and flew 35,769 hours, hauled 133,563 tons of cargo, and carried 66,915 passengers. ANG tactical airlift in theater flew 1,529 missions, hauled 21,032 tons of cargo and carried 39,396 passengers. ANG support airlift outside of theater flew 1,372 missions, hauled 2,371.2 tons of cargo, and carried 12,745 passengers.*

(U) The Air National Guard provided 12 of 13 air refueling units to the war effort. Half of the 63 ANG KC-135

* For Air National Guard unit lists see SD III-11, Rprt (U), NGB/DPMAR (Readiness Unit/Personnel Response Cell), "The Air National Guard in Operation Desert Shield/Storm, An After Actions Summary", 3 Jan 92; and SD III-12, Rprt (U), NGB/CSS, "Air National Guard Unit and Personnel Update, Desert Storm Demobilization", 12 Aug 91.

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tankers served in the theater of operations. They flew 3,519 missions, served 14,141 receivers, and offloaded 118 million pounds of fuel. The two ANG tactical reconnaissance units in theater flew 367 missions and 912 hours. ANG tactical fighter/bombers in theater flew 3,645 missions totaling 8,593 hours. The two ANG F-16 Fighting Falcon units dropped seven million pounds of ordnance on Iraqi targets including vehicles and troop concentrations. The ANG aeromedical activity supported 979 litter patients and 1,559 ambulatory patients, the majority of whom were Iraqi troops who had been wounded in action.

(U) Over 12,000 members of the Air National Guard from all walks of life were tasked in direct support of Operation Desert Storm. The ANG worked alongside active duty counterparts on a daily basis, in difficult conditions, and proved that the Total Force policy worked in a wartime situation.³⁴

(U) The Total Force policy and volunteerism worked well for the ANG, especially, because the war in the Persian Gulf proved to be a popular one. Virtually all ANG airlift and air refueling assets were used in support of the war. USAF fighter assets were abundantly available for combat operations, but Generals Russ, Killey, and Clossner decided to use two ANG and one AFRES fighter unit to demonstrate that the air reserve components had something good to offer the war effort after millions spent in equipment and training for the reserve fighter force. The 169th TFG F-16s, South Carolina ANG, had won the 1989 Gunsmoke competition and were excellent pilots. The 174th TFW, New York ANG, was used because they had recently transitioned from A-10s to FA-16s

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which were equipped with 30mm gunpods for ground support missions. The USAF did not have any in their active component units and wanted to test the weapons system. The 174th had never trained for large deployment of their fighters and were given less than two weeks in theater to prepare for combat. Both fighter units accomplished all missions in a complete and timely manner.

(U) The most critical issues of the war as far as the Air Force was concerned were volunteerism and mobilization of key air reserve assets. The Air Force found through the experience of Operations Desert Shield/Storm that volunteerism offered the nation a true force multiplier in the early days of the contingency. Volunteerism delayed the immediate need for a call-up of reserve forces and allowed the Air Force mission to continue while the procedures of mobilization was in progress. In the case of Operation Just Cause, December 1989 - January 1990, in Panama, volunteer air reserve forces were adequate enough to preclude a reserve mobilization. Air Force MAJCOMs found that they had the support of at least 25 percent of ANG weapons systems and ANG mission support organizations for up to 30 days of the contingency operation through volunteerism.³⁵

(U) Family Support programs were found to be indispensable after ANG units were deployed providing a lifeline between the service member and their families during the crisis and separation. The method of call-up of ANG members, units, and unit components was especially noteworthy. ANG units have never been called to war as planned. General Helmuth von Moltke of the Prussian Army stated in the nineteenth century that "no plan survives

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contact with the enemy". That observation applied to the Air Force and to the Air Guard's experience during the Persian Gulf War. The Air Force must tailor forces to fit the situation in future wars and contingencies and ANG commanders must expect that to happen. Also critical was the demobilization of troops after the war; both families of unit members and employers expect that their Guardsman should be returned home as soon as possible after cessation of hostilities. Operation Desert Shield and Storm also strengthened the working relationship between Headquarters Air Force, the MAJCOMs, NGB/ANGSC, and ANG units and the States and Territories. All of these units are critical for a smooth and effective operation both in combat and staging.

The ANG demonstrated the effectiveness of the total force policy throughout Operations Desert Shield and Storm.³⁶

Counterdrug Operations

(U) For decades illegal drugs entered the United States from a number of countries through various routes and methods. Four major types of narcotics were imported. Hashish primarily came from Middle Eastern and African countries. Opiates and heroin were smuggled into the U.S. from Asia, Europe, Africa, and Mexico. Cocaine came exclusively from South America. Marijuana was smuggled into the U.S. from South and Central America with a significant amount being cultivated in the U.S. See Illustration III-5 on "Use of Illicit Drugs, 1979-1991."³⁷

(U) President Ronald Reagan officially declared "war on drugs" on 30 January 1982 when he established the South Florida Task Force to combat drug smuggling operations in

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Florida. This organization grew and assumed more responsibilities. Eventually this organization became the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) under the direction of the vice president. The NNBIS was charged with the responsibility for coordinating all federal counterdrug efforts.

Illustration III-5 (U)
Use of Illicit Drugs in the U.S. 1979-1991*

* SOURCE: Rprt (U), National Drug Control Strategy,
The White House, Jan 92, p 5.

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(U) This was not the first time a U.S. President had declared war on social problem. President Lyndon B. Johnson had declared war on poverty and energy consumption, but this was the first time the military forces of the U.S. were a part of the proposed solution. The President and Congress had decided in the decade of the 1980s that, in addition to various civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) involved in counterdrug operations, the military, with its large manpower pool and sophisticated equipment, should assist in the war against drugs.

(U) The Department of Defense initially resisted involvement in counterdrug operations because of a fear that it would reduce military readiness while the Soviet Union still posed a significant military threat. Also the tradition of the U.S. military since the early days of the Republic resisted involvement in civil law enforcement matters. In addition to these factors, the Posse Comitatus Act, Title 18 U.S. Code, Section 1385, prohibited the military from providing certain types of assistance to civil authorities and made violations of the law a felony.³⁸

(U) Toward the end of the Reagan presidential administration and into the Bush administration the traffic in illegal narcotics into the United States increased at such a rapid rate that Congress recognized it as a threat to national security, law enforcement, and public health. The enormous problems created by drug abuse and drug trafficking in the U.S. over the past several years caused erosion in American social structures and moral standards. Drug trafficking caused an increase in violent crime and decay within U.S. cities. Drug related problems impaired

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relationships with foreign governments such as Columbia, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and others. The economic drain on the national economy from drug-related crime was immense. In the long run, America's drug war was more critical to its national interests than regional conflicts such as those in Southwest Asia, Africa, and the Persian Gulf. There was a \$200 billion yearly drain in the U.S. economy from drug trafficking and abuse in Fiscal Year (FY) 1991 alone which exceeded the estimated cost of U.S. involvement in Operations Desert Shield/Storm.

(U) Congress made significant changes to laws regarding how the military supported counterdrug operations. In late 1988 the military appropriations bill for FY 1989 assigned DOD as the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of illegal drug traffic into the United States.

(U) In September 1989, President George Bush unveiled the National Drug Control Strategy which explained the severity of the drug crisis in America and proposed policies to combat the problem. Also in September 1989, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney stated that the detection of illegal drugs, counter production and trafficking operations, and drug public awareness programs were priorities of the Department of Defense national security missions.³⁹

(U) Congress represented the will of the people in committing military forces to the drug war. Drug criminals had grown so powerful that they were able to threaten national governments in Latin America. These cartels had as much military power as some countries and were hostile to the United States and international law. Ties between drug

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cartels and terrorist groups became commonplace. Examples of this relationship were the " Sendero Luminoso", or "Shining Path", Maoist guerilla group in Peru which provided protection to cocoa growers in the Huallaga Valley and the "M-19" insurgent group in Columbia which attacked the Columbian Supreme Court at the direction of a cocaine trafficking cartel. They were dislodged from the Supreme Court building by direct Army tank fire.

(U) These ties between drug cartels and insurgent groups were a direct threat to the security of the United States because the combination produced well financed, heavily armed forces that had the capability and the will to destroy governments. Against such odds the problem of fighting the drug war required a coordinated employment of all elements of the government that cut across bureaucratic lines.⁴⁰

History of National Guard Involvement

(U) The role of the National Guard in counterdrug operations began in 1977 when Hawaii Police requested the support of Army National Guard helicopters in "Operation Green Harvest". In this operation Army Guard helicopters transported law enforcement personnel in an attempt to identify cultivated marijuana which they did to great effect.

From that successful beginning through FY 1988 the National Guard conducted its support to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) either in a state active duty status or incidental to required training.⁴¹

(U) Since the Whiskey Rebellion of 1791, Congress had

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been careful to define the limits of the use of military power in civil disturbances or for law enforcement. The Militia Law of 1792 set a precedent for the militia, not federal troops, to "execute the laws of the Union and suppress insurrections" in specific instances. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, likewise prohibited the use of federal military forces to perform internal police functions. The Posse Comitatus Act did not pertain to the Army and Air National Guard when they are in state status. Also Public Law 97-86, passed in 1982, amended the Posse Comitatus Act. The amendment authorized indirect military involvement such as equipment loan, personnel support, training, and sharing information with LEAs. Their indirect support had to be in addition to required training missions or must provide equivalent military training. Furthermore the indirect support could not degrade combat readiness of units or the capacity of the Department of Defense to fulfill its defense mission.⁴²

(U) In the hearings before a subcommittee on appropriations, U.S. Senate, for FY 1989, on 18 April 1989, Lt Gen Herbert R. Temple, Jr., Chief, National Guard Bureau, testified that the increase of National Guard support in counterdrug operations required a more direct funding arrangement. In FY 1987 additional funds were appropriated by Congress for increased National Guard assistance, but they were all in the Operations and Maintenance budget. To be fully effective in a drug support role the National Guard required funding in the respective Army and Air military personnel appropriations. As more states became involved in the war against drugs, the National Guard increased its support to the states and LEAs. General Temple said that

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every effort would be made to honor each request with maximum support without neglecting the wartime readiness of the National Guard.⁴³

(U) During FY 1987 National Guardsmen flew over 800 aircraft hours and spent over 4,900 mandays supporting the war on drugs. There was no adverse impact on unit readiness in National Guard counterdrug participation operations with LEAs according to the NGB.⁴⁴

(U) Fiscal Year 1988 saw increased National Guard participation in counterdrug operations with units in twenty-nine states which performed 370 missions. Again all missions were performed incidental to scheduled training and required no additional funding. The National Guard also supported twenty-six requests from civil authorities for the loan or lease of unit equipment. Support included 3,694 flight hours and 3,478 mandays expended in the war on drugs. Joint operations of the National Guard (Army and Air) and LEAs resulted in the eradication or confiscation of large amounts of marijuana plants, processed marijuana, cocaine, and other illegal drugs.

(U) A one-month test was conducted in August 1988 to determine the effectiveness of using National Guard Military Police in support of U.S. Customs Service searches for drug smuggling. The Customs Service provided additional training, and the federal government provided additional funds to the National Guard in support of the program. Approximately one hundred National Guardsmen checked cargo moving into Florida by ship and into Arizona and Texas by truck. The test program was conducted with no significant problems, and it

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was the first time since the Mexican Revolution (1916 Border Service) that U.S. military personnel had performed land border duty. The main result of the test was that it increased the percentage of inbound cargo which the U.S. Customs Service had been previously able to inspect from four percent to fourteen percent. In 1989 this program was expanded to nearly every major seaport and many major airports throughout the U.S. and increased the U.S. Customs inspection capacity to twenty-three percent.⁴⁵

(U) The FY 1989 National Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts provided funding of not less than \$40 million and not more than \$60 million for increased National Guard support for drug interdiction and law enforcement operations. This was the first NG appropriation specifically for counter drug operations. The Secretary of Defense provided funds to the governors of states who submitted plans which specified how the National Guard was proposed to be used. All counterdrug support operations were required to be in addition to normally scheduled weekend drills and annual training periods.

(U) Beginning in FY 1989 plans from each state were developed in coordination with city, county, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Plans were submitted to the National Guard Bureau (NGB) for review and recommendations for funding. The plans were then forwarded through the appropriate military secretaries to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) for approval. The Secretary of Defense then referred the plans to the Attorney General to evaluate their legality and then the SECDEF made funding decisions.

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(U) Priorities were developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in coordination with federal LEAs and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Final funding decisions were based on these priorities and recommendations by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Guard Bureau, Counterdrug Support Division, and the appropriate military service. Funding of governor's plans was contingent on compliance with law and limited to the amount authorized and appropriated by Congress.

(U) The operational limits of the plans required National Guard members to perform their duty under command and control of state authorities, either in a state active duty status or in U.S. Code Title 32 duty status*. Guard personnel were forbidden to become involved in the seizure of evidence or arrest of individuals who were involved in illegal drug activities. Furthermore Guardsmen should not be in the chain of custody, of evidence, or contraband. Guardsmen were not allowed to process illegal drugs seized during an operation. Whenever possible National Guard personnel were to perform jobs which were related to their military specialties (i.e. Military Police, rotary wing pilots, etc.).⁴⁶

(U) The counterdrug support operations which were planned and conducted in 1989 were continued and expanded in

* Title 32 U.S. Code means that a reservist is under the command of the state adjutant general yet retains the pay and benefits of soldiers or airmen on federal active duty. A Title 32 reservist may not leave the confines of the state to which he or she is assigned.

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1990. In addition to Army National Guard and other Reserve Component participation the Air National Guard used 53,901 mandays** and 1,125 flying hours in support of the war on illegal drugs during FY 1990. Thirty-one units consisting of 4,458 Reservists participated in these operations. The approximate cost of Air National Guard support for FY 1990 was \$8.9 million.⁴⁷

(U) The nation's drug war continued throughout the military buildup and conflict in Southwest Asia during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The Army National Guard and the Air National Guard provided support to the drug interdiction and counterdrug program either incidental to scheduled training or in Congressionally funded, Title 32 active duty for special work (ADSW) tours. Approximately 5,800 operations were performed in addition to training during FY 1991. Those missions were conducted so that they did not interfere with scheduled training. During that fiscal year, the Army and Air Guard used 875,513 mandays on a volunteer basis in Title 32 state status. Missions included aerial and ground reconnaissance and surveillance; aerial and surface transportation of sworn officers and drug contraband, evidence, or suspects in custody. Other missions were ground radar support and cargo inspection missions which were conducted at ground, water, and air points of entry into the U.S.

** (U) One manday is a training acronym for a mandatory workday, one entire twenty four hour period. Reservists and Guardsmen were paid for mandays which were used to provide either training or additional support of the active duty armed forces beyond the minimum days of annual participation required each year.

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(U) Army and Air Guard unit members were trained with law enforcement officers in counterdrug specific subjects. Aerial photo reconnaissance in counterdrug operations was conducted with OV-1D and RF-4C aircraft. Film from these missions was processed by National Guard photo labs and turned over to LEAs. There was coordination and liaison with supported enforcement agencies to include automatic data processing, logistical, maintenance, and engineer support.⁴⁸

(U) The Air National Guard in FY 1991 was involved in the enhanced drug operation in U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) with F-15s and F-16s backfilling active Air Force units which had deployed to Operations Desert Shield/Storm. These aircraft searched the air with their radar for illegal drug flights from Central and South America. In FY 1990 the Army and Air National Guard participated in over 5,000 counter narcotic support operations and used over 550,000 manday in support of federal, state, and local LEAs. Also in FY 1990 the National Guard was responsible for assisting in the removal of \$18.7 billion in illegal drugs from circulation. The Guard eradicated \$13 billion worth of marijuana plants in state sponsored counterdrug programs. Another \$3 billion worth of cocaine, opium, heroin, and other narcotics were intercepted by Guardsmen that year. U.S. Customs Commissioner Carol Hallett said that the increased assistance given to the Customs Service by the National Guard on border duty was absolutely vital to counterdrug operations.

(U) Congressional funding for the Army and Air National Guard in counterdrug operations were \$154 million for FY 1991 and FY 1992, of which \$12 million was for procurement and

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\$142 million for operations. In September 1990, at the direction of LTG Herbert Temple, Chief, NGB, 1986-1990, the California National Guard began operation of the National Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI) at San Louis Obispo.

This provided an opportunity and place for LEAs and military personnel to exchange ideas and share counterdrug training and experience.⁴⁹

National Guard Support Mission

(U) There were fourteen cabinet level departments within the United States Government that had responsibilities in counterdrug efforts. Within each of those departments were numerous agencies which benefited from Air Force (including ANG/AFRES) involvement and resource sharing in counterdrug operations. In order to alleviate some of the redundancy of effort with so many agencies involved in counterdrug operations and programs, Congress enacted the "Omnibus Anti-Substance Abuse Act of 1988". It created the Office of National Drug Control Policy. The director of this office was vested with budgetary control over counterdrug efforts and had responsibility for developing a coherent budget for the various departments and agencies based upon policies established in the National Drug Control Strategy.⁵⁰

(U) After President George Bush committed the Department of Defense to the war on drugs in September 1989, the Air Staff Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations directed the Air National Guard to establish a division to support the President's effort in the war on drugs. The Counterdrug Support Division of the Military Support Directorate was established formally on 12 May 1989. This

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division was established as a joint office consisting of both Army and Air National Guard personnel because counterdrug operations were conducted with both elements.⁵¹

(U) The National Guard Bureau's major role in counterdrug activities was coordinating with the Army and Air National Guard units which supported LEAs that had requested assistance in counterdrug operations. The main focus of the National Guard Counterdrug Support Program was threefold: National Guard units provided support to LEA to interdict illegal drugs entering the U.S.; National Guard personnel and equipment were utilized by LEAs to eradicate domestically grown marijuana (supply reduction); and National Guard personnel assisted LEAs to diminish demand through increased education, prevention, and community service (demand reduction).

(U) Within most states one LEA was designated as the lead agency. This agency was, in many instances, the director of the highway patrol or state police or a task force appointed by the Governor to conduct the local war against drugs. Regardless of the structure the lead agency coordinated state, county, and local requirements with the state's National Guard counterdrug support managers. Federal agencies, which worked through their local field and regional offices, submitted support requests to the National Guard for inclusion into the state's annual Counterdrug Support Plan.⁵²

(U) National Guard personnel in support of state directed counterdrug operations could not participate in arrests, searches of suspects, or be placed in the chain of evidence. National Guard members made arrests and conducted

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searches only when authorized by state law in the following circumstances: when law enforcement officers were assaulted, when they had to make a citizens arrest, when harm to public individuals could be prevented. The Department of Defense preferred that operations in which National Guard members were involved did not involve significant likelihood that such members would be involved in arrests or personnal searches. Guard members could only be involved in counterdrug operations when in Title 32 status under LEA supervision at state level. LEAs were responsible for obtaining any warrants for searches or to determine whether any searches, inspections, or observations require warrants.⁵³

(U) From 1989 to present an annual counterdrug support planning conference was held to provide guidance to the Plans, Operations, and Military Support Officers (POMSO) and the Counterdrug Coordinators of each of the states and territories of the U.S. The POMSO, after coordinating with LEAs at all levels acting for the Adjutant General, developed an Annual Counterdrug Plan which detailed LEA requests for support and proposed state counterdrug mission support operations. All operations were reviewed and certified by the State Attorney General. Each counterdrug operation had to be in support of the sixteen approved missions. See Illustration III-6 for the list of official counterdrug missions.

(U) After the governor's counterdrug plans were reviewed by the National Guard Bureau they were subsequently submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval. At the national level all plans were reviewed for concept, necessary adjustments were made to insure legal compliance and

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adherence with Department of Defense guidelines and policies.

National Guard personnel always performed in counterdrug operations which were in accordance with the governor's prescribed plan and remained in Title 32 status in support of an LEA.⁵⁴

Illustration III-6 (U)

Official National Guard Counterdrug Missions^{*}

(U) Mission #1, Ground Reconnaissance. Reconnoitered areas for cultivated marijuana or other drug operations and eradicated when requested by LEA.

(U) Mission #2, Ground Surveillance. Maintained surveillance of an area suspected as a site for drug smuggling or production activity.

(U) Mission #3, Surface Transportation Support. Transported law enforcement officers and contraband, evidence, or persons in their custody.

(U) Mission #4, Aerial Reconnaissance. Reconnoitered areas by air for cultivated marijuana or other drug operations.

(U) Mission #5, Aerial Surveillance. Maintained aerial surveillance of an area suspected as a site for drug smuggling or production activity.

(U) Mission #6, Aerial Transportation Support. Transported law enforcement officers and contraband, evidence, or persons in their custody by air due to remote location or because speed was essential.

(U) Mission #7, Ground Radar Support. Established and operated ground radar sites capable of detecting and monitoring aircraft which flew into U.S. borders.

(U) Mission #8, Cargo Inspection. Assisted law enforcement officials in inspection of cargo, unoccupied vehicles, containers, aircraft, watercraft, baggage, suspect mail, etc.

(U) Mission #9, Training Program (NG and LEA). National

^{*} Rprt (U), NGB Military Support Directorate, Factbook, Tab 6b, SD III-16.

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Guard personnel and LEAs provided training on selected subjects specific to counterdrug activities. The National InterAgency Counterdrug Institute, San Louis Obispo, California was established in September 1990 and featured year long classes in counterdrug subjects.

(U) Mission #10, Aerial Photo Reconnaissance. National Guard Aircraft were used to generate information about specific areas. Supporting elements provided photo analysis as required.

(U) Mission #11, Coordination, Liaison, and Management. States established coordination and liaison with supported law enforcement and managed all aspects of their Counterdrug Program.

(U) Mission #12, Marijuana Greenhouse/Drug Lab Detection. Missions involved surveillance or monitoring, eradication, destruction, or dismantling of greenhouses. Hazardous materials were not handled by National Guard personnel.

(U) Mission #13, Film Processing for Photo Reconnaissance. Supporting elements provided film processing, photo analysis, and interpretation as required.

(U) Mission #14, Administrative/Information/Automatic Data Processing/Logistics and Maintenance Support. National Guard personnel conducted various approved operations in direct support of law enforcement counterdrug activities.

(U) Mission #15, Engineer Support. States used engineer personnel and assets to provide approved engineer support to law enforcement agencies.

(U) Mission #16, Aerial Interdiction. Resources from various units and states supported joint ANG/ARNG efforts to detect, track, and monitor suspected illegal drug traffickers, and transported law enforcement officers to

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arrest the suspected smugglers/traffickers.

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(U) Air National Guard personnel have supported Commander in Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT) while in Title 10 (U.S. Code) status* since 1989 because of duty outside of the Continental United States. The Air National Guard has provided radar support at Great Inagua, Bahamas, at Providenciales, Turk, and Calicos Islands, and Puerto Plata, Dominican Republic. ANG aerial interdiction support was provided in Panama and Puerto Rico. Usually twenty personnel for each two-week period were provided for these operations and rotated out while the radar equipment remained in place.

In these cases where Guardsmen served in federal status outside of the Continental United States, portable radar installations were used at the Caribbean Island sites mentioned earlier. Also federal status applied to all aircraft crews who flew reconnaissance and radar interception missions from bases in Panama and Puerto Rico.

(U) National Guard assisted illegal drug seizures increased significantly during the past three years. In FY 1989 the amount of drug money seized was \$1.7 million as compared to \$47.5 million in FY 1991. Over four million marijuana plants were eradicated during FY 1989 as compared to 21 million in FY 1991. The street value of illegal drugs seized by LEAs being assisted by the National Guard increased from \$9.8 billion in FY 1989 to \$47 billion in FY 1991. Illustration III-7 depicts the National Drug Control Budget during the 1981-1993 period.

* Title 10 U.S. Code places a reservist under federal mandates and requirements of the Department of Defense and their respective service as an active duty soldier or airman and subjects them to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

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(U) While these statistics were not considered a measure of the complete effectiveness of the National Guard counterdrug support effort, they are an indicator that the flow of illicit drugs had been interrupted when increased resources had been made available. They further demonstrated that the National Guard can be a significant force multiplier for counterdrug activities. See Illustration III-8 for a list of illegal drug seizures from FY 1989 to FY 1992. See Illustrations III-9 and III-10 for the National Guard FY 1991 and FY 1992 Counterdrug Support Budgets.⁵⁵

Illustration III-7 (U)
National Drug Control Budget, 1981-1993^{*}

^{*} SOURCE: Rprt (U), National Drug Control Strategy,
The White House, Jan 92, p 141.

Illustration III-8 (U)

National Guard Assisted Drug Seizures, 1989-1992 *

*SOURCE: Rprt (U), NGB Military Support Directorate, "Factbook," FY 92, Tab 3-c, SD III-17.

Illustration III-9 (U)

National Guard FY 91 Counterdrug Support Budget^{*}

^{*}SOURCE: Rprt (U), NGB Military Support Directorate Briefing, SD III-15.

Illustration III-10 (U)

National Guard FY 92 Counterdrug Support Budget^{*}

^{*}SOURCE: Rprt (U), NGB Military Support Directorate Briefing, SD III-15.

Summary and Conclusions

(U) This chapter focused on four major operations which the Air National Guard (ANG) has participated in between 1986 and 1991. The first contingency, Operation Just Cause, was conducted from December 1989 through January 1990. The Air Guard provided U.S. Southern Command with volunteer airlift and fighter support assets which were already operating in Panama under annual exercises Volant Oak and Cornet Cove. Although Air Guard support was limited in scope during that brief operation, it provided the Air Guard with the opportunity to test the concept of "volunteerism" as well as the National Guard Bureau (NGB)/Contingency Support Staff(CSS) coordination efforts with Headquarters Air Force (HQ USAF) and the major air commands (MAJCOMs).

(U) When Operation Desert Shield began in August 1990, the "volunteer" program tested in Panama provided an immediately available force which Headquarters Air Force could deploy to Southwest Asia in support of the largest American military mobilization since the Berlin Crisis in October 1961. Volunteer Air Guardsmen provided advanced support for the buildup of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf area until Air Guard and Air Force Reserve (AFRES) units could be mobilized. Once federalized, Air Guard units quickly integrated into the active duty Air Force. The air campaign of Operation Desert Storm began on 17 January 1991.

It was the first time since the Vietnam War that Air Guard units had participated in sustained air combat operations. The success of those operations was influenced by the lessons learned by the NGB in exercising the volunteer option for

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Guardsmen and the operation of the NGB/CSS, which provided vital coordination between ANG units and HQ USAF and the MAJCOMs. The performance of ANG volunteers and mobilized units during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was virtually indistinguishable from their active duty counterparts.

(U) Perhaps the most longlasting and significant struggle which the Air Guard participated in from 1986 through 1991 was the war against drugs. That campaign had a significant impact on the nation affecting its economy and society at all levels. The Air Guard was involved in this joint effort with the Army Guard before the Department of Defense (DOD) was totally committed to the effort by the President of the United States in 1989. The Defense Department's counterdrug campaign increased in effort and funding each consecutive year since 1989. Air and Army Guard involvement escalates each year. Although significant progress had been made in seizing illegal drugs, the use of military assets in the counterdrug campaign was controversial. Its overall impact on the larger problem of substance abuse and drug addiction in American society had yet to be determined.

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